Jonathan D. Cohen

Claiming bogus medical reimbursements, he transferred the entirety of his HSA into his bank account to fund his gambling. His mother gave him $8,000 in May to purchase an engagement ring, and over the course of the next three days he transferred almost half of her check into FanDuel.

In the years immediately following the Murphy decision, sportsbooks got almost everything they realistically could have wanted in the American marketplace. Sports gambling became legal in thirty-eight states; online gambling in thirty. Industry lobbying generally kept tax rates low. Partnerships with leagues and celebrity spokespeople embedded gambling into the sports ecosystem. Advertising made it inescapable. And the bets came pouring in.

Internet sports gambling has particular consequences for young bettors, nearly a third of whom said someone has expressed concern to them about their gambling and almost a quarter have at one point lied about the extent of their betting. While most states only allow bets from those who are at least twenty-one, high schoolers have found ways to get in on the action too. Young people are already used to gamified algorithms shaping much of their lives, from who they date to the TV shows they watch. Online sports betting adds a new level of gamification to sports gambling, which is itself a gamification of actual sports.

Young Americans are open to a range of speculative forms of investing, from the stock market to cryptocurrency to video game skins. Many in this generation have disposable income, but not so much that they see a realistic possibility of saving up to buy a home, start a business, or pay off their student loans. So they gamble instead, whether on March Madness or meme stocks, hoping to multiply their money many times over.

In interviews, many current and former lawmakers and industry representatives acknowledged the flaws in Colorado’s initial sports betting system, which they attributed to the fact that Colorado was an early adopter and had few models to learn from. (It was the sixteenth state to launch sports betting after Murphy, and the ninth to launch full online gambling.) But there was nothing forcing the state to adopt so early other than a gambler-esque hope for a quick windfall. Colorado could have sat back and assessed the results from New Jersey and Delaware and designed regulations that addressed the issues faced in other states. With money—or water—in their eyes, it chose not to.

The NFL was terrified of gambling because it would be devastating if fans came to believe that the outcome of that one-yard run was fixed, scripted, rigged. Notwithstanding the popularity of professional wrestling—which actually is scripted—a sports league cannot attract viewers if people believe the outcome to be in any way predetermined. The league’s concern with integrity, then, was as much about ensuring the fairness of its games as ensuring the perception of fairness. “The most precious possessions that we as a football league have are our reputations for integrity and the integrity of our games,” Commissioner Paul Tagliabue told Congress during hearings over PASPA. The league went to extremes to preserve that reputation and distance itself from all things gambling.

In too many states, sports betting regulatory bodies have ceded control to gambling companies. These regulators are charged with managing sports betting and ensuring companies abide by the rules that the regulators put in place. In practice, they seem to see their mandate as getting out of companies’ way while ensuring sportsbooks meet the bare minimum requirements.

Every other addictive product that you can think of, government seeks to regulate its distribution and consumption,” Levant observes. Given gambling’s official classification as addictive, and especially the evidence about the habit-forming potential of online gambling, a public-health framework suggests the need for measures to protect consumers before they have the chance to harm themselves or someone else.